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Abstract – Despite the fact that Indonesia is not one of the claimant states, China’s provocation 
through its fishing boats escorted by Chinese Coast Guard has been violating Indonesia Exclusive 
Economic Zone on South China Sea (SCS) which intersects with Nine Dashed Line (NDL). Up to this 
day, the synergy among Indonesian maritime power instruments to defend Indonesia’s sovereign 
rights is still weak, thus the problem identified in this research is how the instrument of power 
authorized in Indonesia’s maritime domain synergizes to face China’s claim over SCS. Synergy 
analysis is seen from three aspects: perspective, policy, and Rules Of Engangement (ROE) applied 
to operational. This research uses qualitative method to further explore the research question, with 
Soft System Methodology technique to approach the problems through comparison between 
system of thought and real world in a structured manner, as well as supported by NVivo to execute 
the process of data triangulation. Research results show that Indonesia’s maritime power 
instrument have not a harmonious perspective on NDL yet. This study also shows that policy 
created by policy makers and strategic derivatives created by strategy makers of the Government 
of the Republic of Indonesia have not been in harmony, thus appropriate ROE at operational level 
to face China's provocation on the SCS has not been formulated by adjusting authority with 
instrument capability. Overall, the study found that the synergy of Indonesia’s maritime power 
instruments is not yet reliable to deal with China’s Claims over the territory of Indonesia in the SCS. 
Keywords: Synergy, Maritime Power Instruments, Nine Dashed Line, South China Sea, Sovereign  
                      Rights 
 
Introduction 
he South China Sea (SCS) is a sea 
lane filled to the brim with 
strategic interests, not only for 
the coastal countries that surround it, but 
also maritime countries whose economic 
resources come from international trade. 
China claims sea areas that intersect with 
the sovereignty and sovereign rights of 
other countries through the existence of 
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President University, 2015 batch 
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Nine Dashed Line (NDL). Some member 
countries of the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) that are involved in 
conflicts with China are Malaysia, 
Singapore, Vietnam, Philippines and 
Brunei Darussalam. 
One of the lines of the overall NDL 
passes through the Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) and the Indonesian Continent 
Shelf in the northern Natuna Sea. In the 
T 
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illustration of Sea Map No. 354 and 355 
made by the Navy Hydrographic and 
Oceanographic Center (Pushidrosal), the 
Indonesian EEZ area overlaps with one of 
the nine dashed lines claimed by NDL. The 
illustration map shows that there are 
around 83,315.62 square kilometers of 
area that overlap with the NDL claim. 
Legally speaking, Indonesia has stated 
through Law No. 1 of 1973 concerning the 
Indonesian Continental Shelf, that the 
jurisdiction of Indonesia in the north of 
Natuna that intersects with NDL is the 
jurisdiction area of Indonesia.4 
Although Indonesia's EEZ has been 
formulated in illustration maps, the 
government has not legally deposited 
Indonesia's maritime boundaries, 
especially those bordering on neighboring 
countries according to their zoning, to the 
UN Secretary General. Indonesia's claim 
on the EEZ is still only a unilateral claim,5 
which makes it difficult for Indonesia to 
bring the issue of China’s over-claiming 
and Indonesia's EEZ to the international 
community and to take action against 
violations that occurred in the EEZ region. 
China has carried out several provocations 
in the EEZ waters which intersect with NDL 
                                                          
4  Surya Wiranto, Conflict Resolution in Facing 
South China Sea Dispute from International 
claims through Chinese fishing boats 
escorted by the China Coast Guard (CCG). 
Indonesia is currently carrying out a  
moratorium on fishing by foreign parties in 
Indonesia’s EEZ region, meaning that it 
can be ascertained that Chinese fishing 
boats have committed violations by 
catching fish in Indonesia’s EEZ. The 
provocation of China took place from 2010 
to 2013 and from 2015 to 2016. On each 
occasion, the CCG Ship always tried to free 
Chinese fishing boats captured by the 
Indonesian Government. The CCG ships 
even took a dangerous action to release 
Chinese fishing boats, such as by colliding 
with Chinese fishing boats being pulled 
ashore by the MOMAF Supervisory Vessel 
to be brought to justice in the 2016 
incident. 
The lack of harmonization between 
institutions of national power in the 
Government of Indonesia can be seen 
when the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and 
Fisheries (MoMAF), the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and the Ministry of 
Defense (MoD) both announced that the 
instrument would summon the Chinese 
Ambassador as a form of diplomatic 
protest over the violation of Indonesian  
Law Perspective. (Yogyakarta: Leutika 
Prio,2008), p. 15. 
5   Ibid., p. 16. 
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EEZ by Chinese fishing boats and 
deliberate ship crashes in an effort to 
release Chinese fishing boats captured by 
the MOMAF vessel on 19 March 2016.6 
The instrument of maritime power 
shows a weak synergy with the existence 
of different perspectives on NDL, some 
see from the perspective of international 
law and see from the fact that China has 
made a provocation in the jurisdiction of 
Indonesia. Indonesia's policy has also not 
been able to answer the management of  
                                                          
6   Aaron L. Conelly, Indonesia in south China Sea: 
Walking alone, (Sydney: Lowy Institute for 
International Policy, 2017), p. 5 
 
 
jurisdiction and how the instrument can 
achieve it in a targeted manner. 
 Meanwhile, provocation carried out 
by China with CCG escort have led to 
events that endanger personnel in the 
MoMAF Supervisory Vessel (KP), causing 
Indonesia unable to bring the majority of 
Chinese fishing boats to maximum legal 
action. 
This study focuses on (1) synergy 
between maritime power instruments 
that are reviewed through perspective on 
Figure 1. Illustration Map overlaying China’s NDL Claim and Indonesia’s ZEE and Continental  
                  Shelf 
Source: Sopsal (2017) 
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SCS disputes, (2) policies made by these 
instruments to deal with the development 
of SCS disputes, and (3) operational 
response of these instruments when 
provocations are carried out by China in 
the jurisdiction of Indonesia that 
intersects with NDL. The synergy of 
Indonesia's maritime power instruments 
will be able to create clarity on the 
direction of Indonesia's policies and 
strategies to show the government's firm 
stance of maintaining Indonesia's 
sovereign rights in its jurisdiction. 
 
Research Method 
This study uses primary and secondary 
data. Primary data in this study were 
obtained from interviews conducted 
through visits to research subjects and 
meeting with informants. Interviews with 
informants are carried out with in-depth 
interview techniques. The subject of the 
study was determined based on the 
relationship of maritime instruments to 
the SCS issue, especially the instruments 
mentioned in the Action Plan of 
Indonesian Maritime Policy7 – Priority 
Program A of Maritime Boundaries, Ocean 
Space, and Maritime Diplomacy set to 
                                                          
7  Presidential Regulation No. 16 of 2017 
concerning Indonesian Maritime Policy. 
8  Peter Checkland & John Poulter, Learning for 
Action: A Short Definitive Account of Soft 
preserve Indonesia's interests and 
affirming of Indonesian sovereignty in the 
SCS: Coordinating Ministry of Maritime 
Affairs, Coordinating Ministry for Politics, 
Law and Security, MoMAF, MoD, MoFA, 
and Indonesian Navy National Army (TNI 
AL). The informants selected in this study 
are based on expertise related to the issue 
of SCS disputes, NDL, and the synergy of 
instruments to deal with it. This study 
divides the role of power instruments in 
three groups, i.e.: Coordinating Ministry 
for Maritime Affairs Coordinating Ministry 
for Politics, Law and Security are included 
in the regulator group of strategy makers, 
while the MoMAF, MoD and MoFA are 
included in the regulator group of policy 
makers. The Navy and MoMAF are 
included in the implementing group that 
went directly to the field. 
Soft System Methodology (SSM) is 
employed to find comparisons between 
system of thought and the real world to 
produce recommendations for 
improvements to problems.8 A qualitative 
approach is employed to discuss and 
further explore problem 
recommendations to answer research 
Systems Methodology and its use for 
Practitioners, (Singapura: John Wiley and Sons 
Limited, 2006), pp. 193-194. 
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questions while finding appropriate 
suggestions for the problems under study. 
There are seven steps of SSM 
applied in this study, i.e.: 
•  Step 1: Problem Situation 
The first step in SSM is to map 
information and views related to the 
problem. This study makes an overall 
picture of the problems and basic 
research conducted through books, 
journals, printed media, internet media, 
and other secondary sources. 
•  Step 2: Overview of the situation 
This step serves to capture the facts of 
the problem that will be explored. The 
overview of situation in the SSM is 
carried out through Analysis One, i.e. 
aspects of intervention, Analysis Two, 
i.e. social aspects, Analysis Three, i.e. 
political aspects, and Rich Picture which 
contains important opinions from all 
informants regarding the problem. 
•  Step 3: Root Definition 
Root Definition (RD) is a definition 
formulation of the transformation 
process to achieve the desired 
intervention (Lester, 2008). This study 
formulates three RDs which relate to 
three research questions about 
elements of synergy, in accordance 
with the facts in Analysis One to Three 
and Rich Picture. The three RDs were 
tested with analysis of Customer, 
Actors, Transformation Process, 
Worldview (Perspective), Owner, 
Environmental/External Factors 
(CATWOE) and analysis of 3E Criteria 
(Efficacy, Efficiency, Effectiveness). 
•  Step 4: Conceptual Model 
 The conceptual model in this study is 
developed from all three RDs in the 
system of though, which is a human 
activity system that contains the ideal 
steps to realize RD. 
• Step 5: Comparison 
 Comparisons are made in this study to 
compare between the models that 
have been made with the actual 
situation. This step is done to find out 
what steps the owners have not taken, 
while the difference between the ideal 
model and the real world is called the 
gap. The range found in this study is 
used to produce recommendations for 
improving the problems in the synergy 
of Indonesia's maritime power 
instrument to face China's claim to SCS. 
•  Step 6: Improvement 
The next step is to discuss the range 
found in the comparison step using 
theory and supported by the results of 
data analysis. 
•  Step 7: Action to Fix Problems 
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The final step is done by stating which 
changes (transformations) can be 
applied to correct the problem. 
This study is also assisted by the 
NVivo application as a tool to carry out the 
coding process, code search, category 
discovery, data triangulation, and to 
produce validity testing through data 
consistency. The hierarchy of code in 
NVivo uses parent nodes and child nodes 
to indicate the category or focus of the 
discussion of the study.9 The relation 
model is also generated using NVivo, 
which is to see the relationship between 
code or nodes and data sources. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 Agustinus Bandur, Qualitative Research: 
Methodology, Design, and Technical Analysis of 
Chinese provocation in the Indonesian 
jurisdiction occurred in 2013, 2015 and 2016 
where Chinese fishing boats entered the 
Indonesian EEZ to illegally capture fish. 
The fishing boats were always escorted by 
CCG ships that consistently try to prevent 
Indonesian law enforcement vessels from 
apprehending these fishing boats. Details 
on the provocation incidents by China can 
be seen in Table 1. 
China's provocation caused unrest 
among Indonesia's maritime power 
instruments, the uncoordinated protest 
between MoMAF, MoFA and MoD became 
one  of  the  proofs that Indonesia  did  not  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data using NVivo 11 Plus (Jakarta: Mitra Wacana 
Media, 2016), p. 23. 
 
Figure 2. The Result of Code and Data Triangulation through NVivo  
Source: Processed by the author, 2018 
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yet have synergies to deal with Chinese 
NDL claims which were affirmed by their 
provocation. Policies formulated by 
maritime power instruments have also not 
been able to harmonize instrument steps 
to show a firm attitude towards Chinese 
NDL claims, because they are still at the 
level of each ministry without national 
policy guidelines. 
Some instruments of Indonesian maritime 
power consider that NDL claims are not a 
threat because they do not conform   to 
the  principles  of  the  United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), but the assumption that NDL is 
a threat also arises mainly from 
instruments  that  go  directly  to  the  field 
to enforce the law because Chinese 
provocation actually happened. Chinese 
NDL claims that intersect with Indonesian 
jurisdiction become one of the maritime 
issues which shows that Indonesia's 
maritime power instrument does not yet 
have a strong synergy to maintain 
maritime security in its domain. 
Table 1. Incidents of Territorial Violations by Chinese Fishing Boats and CCG 
Year Chinese Vessel Incident 
2013 
Guibeiyu Fishing 
Boat 58081 
The Navy received news about fishing boats stalked by Chinese 
fishing boats with greater tonnage. Chase, arrest, and 
investigation (Jarkaplid) was carried out. For the safety of the 
press, the fishing vessel was released. 
2015 
Shun Hang Fishing 
Boat-681 
CCG Ship-141 
When Jarkaplid was carried out, the CCG Ship number 141 came and 
requested the fishing boat to be released. Then at 18.15 there was 
a request from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to release 
the fishing boat. The fishing boat was released with a warning not 
to fish again in Indonesian waters. 
2016 
Kway Fey Fishing 
Boat 10078 
CCG Ship-3184 dan 
CCG Ship-3304  
 
KP tried to bring the fishing boat ashore, but on the way, the fishing 
boat was hit by one of the CCG Ships, followed by the appearance 
of the second CCG Ship. The ship's crew (ABK) was secured with 
the help of KAL, while the evidence was carried by the CCG Ship. 
Gui Bei Yu Fishing 
Boat 27088 
CCG Ship-3303 
One KRI captured and took the fishing boat to the mainland, then 
was intercepted by the CCG Ship asking to stop. 
CCG ship conducted hostile intent. 
Another KRI approached the first KRI towards the CCG ship to 
escort out of Indonesian waters. 
CCG Ship 3303 and 
2501 escorting 10-
12 Chinese Fishing 
Boats 
One Chinese fishing boat was captured after being caught by KRI 
for stealing fishes in jurisdictional area, while other ships fled by 
conducting hostile intent. 
One of the CCG ships approached, requesting the fishing boat to 
be released. 
Other CCG ships approached. With KRI's siege and debate, the CCG 
ships left.  
Source: Sopsal, 2017
112 | Journal of Defense & State Defense | August 2018, Volume 8 Number 2 
 
Before discussing further about the 
synergy of Indonesia's maritime power 
instruments, the definition and deepening 
of synergy needs to be explored. This 
paper will use Graves’ concept to discuss 
the synergy of Indonesia's maritime 
power instruments. Graves defines 
synergies as follows: 
"The interaction of two or more 
agents, resources or activities such as the 
product is worth the sum of the 
component parts (1 + 1> 2).10" 
Synergy is where several different 
entities interact and make better results 
than when done by an individual entity. 
The purpose of 1 + 1> 2 above is that if an 
entity synergizes with one other entity, 
the output or result will be greater than 
the results of the two entities working 
separately. 
"1 + 1" does not always have to 
produce "2", it can be more than two 
where bigger than two means greater 
synergy. Synergy can be in the form of 
interactions from different inputs, thus 
there are different types of synergy. 
Based on Graves' theory, 
parameters derived from the synergy 
elements of maritime power instruments 
in this study are: 
                                                          
10  Sue Graves, Synergies between Bilateral and 
Multilateral Activities. (Copenhagen: Ministry of 
a.)  Harmonious perspective 
(organizational synergy) 
A harmonious perspective can be seen 
by looking at the perspective on the 
threat of Chinese claims over the SCS. 
This is meant to see whether the 
instruments of maritime power have 
different perceptions in view of 
China's claims over the SCS. This 
parameter can also be seen from the 
instrument's perspective on 
Indonesia's national interests in the 
Indonesian EEZ on the SCS, the 
instrument's perspective on 
Indonesia's position as a non-claimant 
state, and the instrument's 
perspective on Indonesia's bilateral 
relations with China. The perspective 
that will be explored from the 
maritime power instrument in this 
study will produce a measure of 
integration of perspectives that is 
built by the maritime power 
instrument on the SCS dispute as a 
non-financial resource to achieve 
synergy. 
b.)  Synergized policy (policy synergy) 
Harmonization is one level in synergy 
– higher than coordination, and lower 
than integration. The most 
Foreign Affairs of Denmark Evaluation Study 
2008/2, 2008), pp. 12-13. 
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appropriate level to form policy 
synergies is harmonization, because 
organizations that formulate policies 
have their own fields and cannot be 
integrated. The parameter of the 
synergized policy is the harmonization 
of policies, where each instrument will 
have an individual policy, but the 
policy does not overlap and is not 
contradictory. The parameters of a 
harmonized policy can be seen from 
the understanding of the maritime 
power instrument towards its role in 
maintaining Indonesia's sovereign 
rights in the SCS. The author also 
investigates the specific policies of 
each instrument against SCS disputes 
and Chinese provocations on the 
Indonesian EEZ, to find out the 
presence or absence of overlaps and 
contradictions among these policies. 
c.)  A clear and directed ROE (operational 
synergy) 
The ROE referred to in this study is 
ROE at the policy level, to see that the 
instrument of maritime power already 
knows its role in giving attitude or 
response, when Chinese provocation 
occurs in Indonesia's EEZ on SCS. The 
ROE discussed in this study will then 
be reduced to ROE at operational 
level, with the existence of rules when 
facing certain opponents at sea, 
including in the condition of hostile 
intent and hostile act. ROE is needed 
so that the Government of Indonesia 
through its instruments of maritime 
power has a prompt and appropriate 
response when the incident of 
Indonesian EEZ violations (or other 
incidents related to Indonesia's 
sovereign rights in the SCS) is carried 
out once again by the Chinese. 
 
The Perspective of Maritime Power 
Instruments on NDL 
Perspectives are resources or intellectual 
assets that ought to be possessed by 
instruments of maritime power, these 
intellectual assets are used as the basis of 
deeper synergy. Perspective is a basic 
element to measure synergy. Perspective 
is the foundation for determining the 
attitude of the maritime power instrument 
on NDL issues. The results of the study 
show that the regulator group, both policy 
makers and strategy groups and 
implementing groups have different 
perspectives. There are three perspectives 
that arise from the modes of coding, SSM, 
and NVivo based on the processing of the 
results of interviews with instruments, 
namely: 
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a.)  Chinese claims are not a threat to 
Indonesia because they are not in 
accordance with international law. 
Indonesia and China are two countries 
that ratify UNCLOS, meaning if there 
is a dispute between the two 
countries, then the main reference is 
UNCLOS – not other arguments such 
as the Traditional Fishing Zone that is 
not in accordance with International 
Law. 
b.)  Chinese Claims Are a Threat Because 
Chinese Provocation in Indonesian 
Jurisdictions Is Real. In regards of 
discussions on Chinese strategy, there 
is a perspective among the instrument 
that the provocation carried out by 
Chinese fishing boats was part of the 
Chinese government's strategy. Data 
and analysis from Sopsal show that 
Chinese fishing boats that enter 
Indonesian jurisdiction are always 
escorted by Corvette to Fregate CCG 
ships.11 It can be assumed that the 
state has a stake in the provocation 
carried out by China through its CCG 
ships thus it poses a real threat to 
                                                          
11  Sopsal’s primary data on Indonesian Navy’s 
operation in Norther Natuna, personal 
communication, 2017. 
Indonesia's sovereign rights in its 
jurisdiction. 
c.)  Chinese Claims Could Potentially be a 
Threat to Regional Stability. The 
instrument is aware of the fact that 
the emergence of escalation or 
spillover conflict will disrupt the 
stability of the region. Although 
Indonesia does not recognize the 
existence of NDL claims on legal basis 
and is not a claimant state, the claim 
has stirred reaction out of the 
claimant states in the region, thus 
could potentially result in regional 
instability.12 
Threats arising from Chinese claims 
over Indonesian jurisdictions can be 
mapped by employing Bueger’s matrix of 
threats to Maritime Security.13 This 
concept argues that events in the 
maritime domain can be categorized in 
more than one threat. China's claim to 
Indonesia's jurisdiction is a threat of IUU 
Fishing because Chinese fishing boats 
illegally fish in Indonesian EEZ but at the 
same time, it is also a threat of inter-state 
disputes due to the protest and criticisms 
thrown by the two countries over 
12  Lutfi Rauf, Deputy of Division of Foreign Policy 
Coordination, personal communication, 10 
October 2017. 
13  Christian Bueger, “What Is Maritime Security?” 
Elseiver Journal of Marine Policy, no 53 2015. 
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overlapping claims in the NDL area. This 
mapping shows that China's claim to 
Indonesian jurisdiction cannot be 
approached through just one dimension. 
Economic development, human security, 
and national security are the dimensions 
that are the focus for the Government of 
Indonesia to deal with Chinese claims over 
Indonesia's jurisdiction. 
With              the      three       emerging 
perspectives, the Government of 
Indonesia must look at it from a dynamic 
perspective as in the Bueger concept. 
They should not be confined to only 
International Law approach and sees 
Chinese claims merely as a threat to 
regional stability, because IUU Fishing and 
Chinese     fishing      boats’     provocations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
against sovereign rights are a national 
threat. At the same time, it should not only 
focus on the provocation and potential 
threat of Chinese claims, because it needs 
to consider bilateral relations with China 
as a trade and investment partner. 
With SSM, this study  analyzes how 
these different perspectives can be 
bridged     to     find    synergies. Indonesian 
Instruments of Maritime Power requires 
clear guidelines that can be received 
completely by the Government of 
Indonesia as a whole. Ideally produced 
guidelines are resulted from a perspective 
jointly formulated and agreed upon by 
taking into an account all elements and 
dynamic viewpoints, based on an analysis 
of   the   development  of  SCS  dispute and  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Mapping of Threat Arising from China’s Claim over Indonesia’s  
                   Jurisdictional Area in Maritime Security Matrix  
Source: Bueger, 2015 (has been re-processed) 
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Indonesia's position in the current region, 
including the measurement of Indonesia's 
and China’s strategic strength in around 
Northern Natuna. 
The absence of guidelines that 
objectively and comprehensively express 
attitudes that must be demonstrated in 
harmony by all instruments of maritime 
power in Indonesia can telegraph to other 
countries (especially China) that Indonesia 
does not have a firm attitude towards the 
issues at hand. One example is the journal 
"Indonesia in the South China Sea: Walking 
Alone" which states that the instrument of 
power in Indonesia has been walking 
separately in conducting protest, between 
the MoMAF, MoFA, and the MoD – all of 
which showed a lack of synergy within the 
Government of Indonesia.14 
At national level, a country's 
guidelines for an issue are usually formally 
expressed in a policy. The same is also true 
for guideline on SCS issue – it is necessary 
for synergizing the perspective and 
actions of the maritime power instrument 
to form a policy product. Furthermore, 
policies will be discussed in the next 
section. 
 
                                                          
14   Aaron L. Conelly, Op.cit., p. 6. 
15 Peter Halse et al, “Orchestration in Work 
Environment Policy Programs”. Nordic Journal 
The Harmonization of Maritime 
Instrument’s Policy in Dealing with 
China’s Claim over the SCS 
Instruments of power categorized as 
policymakers have formulated policies for 
SCS disputes including China's claims to 
SCS, they are the Coordinating Ministry of 
Politics, Law and Security and the 
Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs. 
The problem is that the policy is only 
applied within the vicinity of ministries 
under the coordination of each 
Coordinating Ministry, not nationally 
applicable and not carried out jointly by 
the Government of Indonesia and all 
instruments of maritime power. 
A harmonized policy is an emerging 
buzzword within the study of public policy 
and statehood in the Western world. 
Harmonized policy is a strategy in which 
different stakeholders and groups of 
activities are integrated into unified 
programs aimed at specific target 
groups.15 Harmonized policy is not 
formulated by combining policies but by 
actively developing policy programs in a 
coordinated manner so it can coordinate 
the implementation of activities to achieve 
the greatest possible result. 
of Working Life Studies, Vol. 7 No. 3, 2017, pp. 45-
46. 
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The absence of a harmonized policy 
is a loss for the Government of Indonesia. 
One example is the ambiguity of the order 
of the President of the Republic of 
Indonesia concerning sea defense in North 
Natuna. The President of the Republic of 
Indonesia ordered to defend the Unitary 
Republic of Indonesia when visiting North 
Natuna, then the order came again to not 
make gunfire, thus creating a dilemma in 
the field.16 Military institutions are state 
tools to carry out defense, and according 
to their functions must be submissive and 
obedient to government decisions, which 
is led by the head of government. It is only 
natural for the TNI to carry out a political 
decision. The problem is that the decision 
creates a dilemma for the TNI to take 
decisive action when it comes to dealing 
with threats on the ground. The ideal 
government decision is a firm and 
unambiguous decision, so that it can 
provide certainty to the instruments of 
power as implementers in the field – in this 
case the TNI and MOMAF. 
This shows the internal effects of an 
un-harmonized policy, where policies 
cannot be translated into coherent and 
mutually supportive strategies, thus the 
                                                          
16 Colonel (L) Retarto, Paban VI General Staff of 
Maritime Potential, personal communication, 26 
September of 2017. 
instruments of maritime power can only 
go in accordance to their own 
perspectives. Instruments that have to go 
to the field will follow the instructions 
given by the instrument formulating 
policies or strategies. The implementing 
instrument will depend on existing 
political decisions, even if they have a 
desire to take different actions to carry 
out their duties in the field. 
Meanwhile, the external effect of an 
un-harmonized policy is that the 
Government of Indonesia cannot display a 
firm attitude towards Chinese claims. This 
is inferred from the analysis of interview 
result that the instrument of power going 
to the field to deal with instruments that 
run relationships with other countries 
consider that the diplomatic instruments 
are too cautious – whereas according to 
the implementing instrument, regional 
issues is not to be compromised. Both 
informants of the MOMAF and Indonesian 
Navy saw that the MoFA had not 
sufficiently fought for Indonesia's national 
interests, especially with the existing bias 
of MoFA’s diplomacy, the MOMAF 
informants were worried that the 
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message conveyed by the Government of 
Indonesia was not effective.17 
Comparisons between systems of 
thought and the real world in this study 
found that there is no shared 
understanding among the instruments of 
maritime power on the necessity of a 
harmonized policy to safeguard 
Indonesia's sovereign rights in North 
Natuna. Indonesian Government’s policy 
on Chinese claims in the SCS has been 
formulated by the Coordinating Ministry 
of Politics, Law and Security and 
Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs, 
but without harmonization.1819 These two 
policies are still only applied within the 
Coordinating Ministries and the ministries 
under it, without being applied as national 
guidelines. 
China is a country that has 
consistency in its strategy to occupy the 
area it claims but with an evolving 
approach. The Silk Road maritime maps 
from the Nan Qing Dynasty, to Zheng He's 
voyage, up to the emergence of the Belt 
and Road Initiative remain consistent in 
                                                          
17  Arief Indra Kusuma Adhi, Head of Subdivision of 
PSDKP Fisheries Crime Investigation, personal 
communication, 11 October 2017. 
18  Surya Wiranto, Teaching Materials: “Case Study: 
Managing Potential Conflict in The South China 
Sea”, (Bogor: Universitas Pertahanan, 2017). 
19 Sora Lokita, Head of Division of Maritime 
Boundaries Negotiation and Dispute 
terms of mapping line for hundreds of 
years.20 
The consistency of Chinese strategy 
and the evolution of China's attitude must 
be of greater concern to the Government 
of Indonesia because China is building a 
maritime strategy and running it for 
hundreds of years. If Indonesia does not 
immediately decide what it wants in 
managing its maritime domain and does 
not formulate it in a policy to hold all the 
instruments of Indonesian maritime 
power, then Indonesia could potentially 
be unable to counteract China's 
hegemony in the region. 
The strategy is implemented by the 
relevant ministry because the strategy 
works in a strategic environment that has 
unique obstacles in it. Strategy makers are 
considered successful if they understand 
the circumstances of a complex strategic 
environment and formulate a consistent 
strategy. A good strategy maker is the 
person who has knowledge and abilities in 
the targeted fields.21 
Settlement, personal communication, 27 
October 2017. 
20   Loc.cit. 
21  Harry R. Yarger, Strategic Theory for The 21st 
Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy. 
(Pennsylvania: The Strategic Studies Institute 
U.S. Army War College, 2006), pp. 17-18. 
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The development of Natuna 
archipelago to show the existence of 
Indonesia in the border region is one of 
the policies of choice. The development 
and management of maritime resources 
around the waters of Natuna Islands are 
discussed in the policy formulated by the 
Coordinating Ministry of Politics, Law and 
Security and Coordinating Ministry of 
Maritime Affairs. Developing the area 
around Natuna Islands in terms of 
economic, tourism, fisheries, oil and gas 
services, foreign policy, and defense, 
requires a strategy from the Ministry of 
Tourism, MOMAF, Ministry of Economy, 
MoFA, and MoD. 
National Security is realized through 
political, economic and military (PEM) 
strategies that can go together and be 
mutually supportive. Policies formulated 
by the Government of Indonesia must be 
able to respond to China's claims to 
Indonesia's jurisdiction by analyzing 
problems and their impact on Indonesia 
from various dimensions, to realize 
National Security. A threat to sovereign 
rights caused by Chinese claims to SCS 
should not only be seen from the military 
aspect, because the conditions on the 
ground indicate that there are economic 
problems, namely the lack of Indonesian 
fishing boats that can reach those places, 
thus IUU Fishing violations can occur 
easily. With the development of economic 
sector in the Natuna archipelago, the 
welfare of the people of the border region 
will be built up, hence public awareness to 
participate in maintaining sovereignty and 
sovereign rights will be even higher 
because the community will no longer 
focus on welfare issues. 
 
The ROE of Indonesian Instruments of 
Maritime Power to Deal with China’s 
Provocation in Indonesian EEZ 
Operational synergy is the synergy of 
instruments in the field that can be felt 
directly by implementers but the effect 
can then be felt by policy makers. In this 
study, operational synergies refer to rules 
of engagement in which the products are 
regulation of the operation of maritime 
power instrument when dealing with 
China's provocation in the Indonesian EEZ 
that intersects with NDL. If the synergies 
in the perspective and policy settings can 
be fulfilled with harmonized policies, then 
the problems in the field are about how 
the instruments do what should be done 
in the face of a provocation. 
The NVivo triangulation results show 
that the crucial problem of Indonesia's 
maritime power instrument in the 
Indonesian EEZ that intersects with NDL is 
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the emergence of an unbalanced force. 
The initial threat of the Chinese 
provocation in the Indonesian EEZ was 
fishing boats entering Indonesian EEZ and 
fishing boats entering Indonesian 
jurisdiction that intersects with the NDL 
claim. Fishing boats are legally allowed to 
enter the EEZ if they get permission from 
the coastal country. 
According to UNCLOS 1982, the 
coastal country has the right to determine 
Total Allowable Catch (TAC) to prevent 
over-exploitation. When the catching 
capacity of a coastal country is less than 
the TAC, other countries are allowed to 
enter into EEZs with an agreement or 
arrangement. The Government of 
Indonesia through MOMAF has 
determined a moratorium on foreign 
fishing boats (KIA), hence Indonesian 
Government's license for KIA was not 
issued to catch fish in Indonesian EEZ.22 
KIA that enters the Indonesian EEZ area 
automatically becomes illegal and must be 
dealt with by law enforcement 
instruments. 
The main problem of operational law 
enforcement instrument in Indonesian 
EEZ that intersects with NDL is the ship 
given the authority to enforce the law in 
                                                          
22  KKP Regulation No. 56 of 2014 concerning the 
Moratorium of Permits for Fishing Business in 
the EEZ waters of Natuna archipelago, 
which borders another country, does not 
have enough strength to balance the ship 
it must dealt with. 
The supervisory vessel (KP) of 
MOMAF is designed only to deal with KIA 
that violates the law, meaning the ship 
does not have large weapons such as 
cannons. Initial contact with CCG occurred 
because KP took action on Chinese fishing 
boats entering jurisdictional waters. When 
CCG made physical contact with the KP 
whose position at that time was carrying 
out law enforcement against Chinese 
fishing boats, the KP’s strength was 
nothing compared to CCG which had a 
large ship similar to battleships. As a 
result, harassment was received by the KP 
which was supposed to be a law 
enforcement instrument against 
violations committed by Chinese 
fishermen. 
Indonesia’s power in its EEZ that 
deals with foreign power (e.g. CCG) that 
has bigger ship and weaponries has 
caused Indonesia to be unable to take firm 
legal action. Chinese ships also often take 
actions that ultimately endanger 
Indonesian law enforcement. The 
unbalanced power between the 
the Fisheries Management Area of the Republic 
of Indonesia 
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supervisory vessels of MOMAF dealing 
with CCG resulted in Indonesian law 
against foreign boats cannot be fully 
enforced.   Indonesia's   sovereign    rights 
ccannot be maintained when law 
enforcement does not run optimally.23 The 
Article 69 paragraph (4) number 3 of Law 
No. 45 of 2009 Amendment to Law No. 31 
of 2004 concerning fisheries stated that 
supervisory vessels shall be able to stop, 
inspect, carry, and detain vessels that 
commit violations. In reality, the 
supervisory vessels of MOMAF which 
patrols without KRI support can only bring 
the ship's crew (ABK) of Chinese fishing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23  Lutfi Rauf, Op.cit. 
boats, because the Chinese fishing boat 
was hit or brought back by CCG. 
The instrument of maritime power 
that     becomes    the      implementer     at 
operational level cannot fully enforce the 
law because it must consider the 
capabilities and weapons of its vessels. In 
some cases, CCG has conducted hostile act 
such as by cutting the path. In the end, 
those law enforcement ships cannot 
detain boats violating sovereign rights and 
can only chase them away.24 
Due to the lack of instrument’s 
capabilities in running its authority, they 
can only achieve less than optimal result.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24  Sora Lokita, Op.cit. 
Figure 4. Division of Authority among Indonesian Maritime Ships  
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Sopsal’s analysis shows that China 
often uses battleships for coast guard and 
fishermen who have been indoctrinated 
by the Chinese Government. China has 
consistently affirmed its claim by using the 
CCG ships to escort its fishing boats that 
provoke Indonesian sovereign rights in 
their jurisdiction. 
Indonesian EEZ which intersects 
with the NDL claim is the waters bordering 
Vietnam and Malaysia. In addition to 
waters around the Natuna Islands, EEZ in 
every Indonesian water are separated by a 
not too broad ocean that borders the 
waters of another country. Although 
Indonesian waters do not border with 
Chinese waters under international law, 
China is consistent with its claims on the 
SCS indicated by the entry of their fishing 
boats into the NDL claim area even though 
it is located in the jurisdiction of Indonesia. 
With the incident in 2016 where the 
CCG ship crashed into a Chinese fishing 
boat that was about to be captured by the 
supervisory ship of MOMAF, the 
Government of Indonesia must review its 
ROE in the field. The MOMAF does have 
the authority to enforce the law, especially 
in the field of IUU Fishing. But in reality, 
                                                          
25  Lt. Colonel Rasyid Al-Hafiz, Paban II General 
Staff of Operation of Navy Headquarter, 
personal communication, 3 November 2017. 
the supervisory ship’s capability is nothing 
compared to the CCG ships that escort 
Chinese fishing boats. 
As discussed, the consequence of 
power imbalance is the lack of law 
enforcement against violations that occur 
in the jurisdiction of Indonesia. According 
to the Article 69 paragraph (4) number 3 
of Law No. 45 of 2009 Amendment to Law 
No. 31 of 2004 concerning fisheries, 
supervisory vessels shall be able to stop, 
inspect, carry, and detain vessels that 
commit violations. Due to physical contact 
with CCG, boats that commit violations 
cannot be arrested and detained by the 
MOMAF for further legal measure. 
The MOMAF already has a 
systematic investigation and arrest 
procedure for illegal fishing. However, the 
reality in the field shows that in dealing 
with CCG ships, supervisory ships of 
MOMAF was nothing compared to CCG 
ships. At the same time, the Navy is 
designed to have a police role to enforce 
the law, because in areas bordering other 
countries, the possibility of boats being 
escorted by coast guard or navy is very 
large.25 
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The supervisory ships of MOMAF can 
exercise its authority to operate up to the 
Indonesian EEZ, but it must coordinate 
with the Navy to get support. If the 
supervisory ships of MOMAF made 
another engagement with CCG ship during 
a law enforcement operation, KRI will be 
ready to deal with the CCG if they conduct 
a hostile act or hostile intent against the 
supervisory ships of MOMAF. 
The presence of KRI's support for 
the supervisory ships of MOMAF which 
carried out operations up to the 
Indonesian EEZ could balance the power 
between Indonesia and China or other 
countries in the sea. This balance will 
maximize the law enforcement 
procedures carried out by the MOMAF and 
the Navy to those violating the sovereign 
rights in the Indonesian EEZ. Indonesia will 
be able to firmly implement Law No. 45 of 
2009 Amendments to Law No. 31 of 2004 
concerning Fisheries, by stopping and 
detaining boats. In that way, Indonesia will 
be able to telegraph a message to other 
countries that Indonesia will firmly 
enforce its sovereign rights in its 
jurisdictional area. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendation 
The findings in this study are that the 
instruments of maritime power in 
Indonesia have not have a harmonized 
perspective in regard to NDL yet. This 
perspective must be bridged by looking at 
the development of SCS and Indonesia's 
position in it. A harmonized perspective 
will be obtained if the Indonesian 
Government already has guidelines for its 
instruments of maritime power. An 
effective guideline will be able to integrate 
perspectives and regulate collaboration in 
the task of maritime power instruments 
which will result in a harmonized policy. 
The findings in the study indicate 
that the policy of the policy maker and the 
derivative strategy of the strategy maker 
have not been harmonized. The 
Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs 
and Coordinating Ministry of Politics, Law 
and Security are not aligned – each has a 
policy that does not strengthen each 
other. The recommendation to formulate 
a harmonized policy is not only meant to 
combine two policies, but to re-evaluate 
the two policies of the policy maker that 
relate to the SCS problem and measure 
which policies will be implemented with a 
measure of time. Then, from the policy 
that has been harmonized, the ministries 
under the two coordinating ministries can 
create a strategy that supports the 
realization of the strategy in accordance 
with its strategic fields and environment. 
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The size and weaponry owned by the 
Supervisory Ship of MOMAF is not 
sufficient to deal with larger ships, 
especially the CCG ships. The 
recommendation of this study is that the 
Government of Indonesia should design 
the authority and operation area in 
accordance with the capabilities of the 
maritime power instrument, so that law 
enforcement can be carried out optimally. 
The MOMAF can patrol the fisheries 
management areas up to the EEZ, but only 
for EEZ that does not directly border 
another country. As for the other EEZ, the 
MOMAF should coordinate with the Navy, 
because the risk of dealing with coast 
guard ships and battleships of other 
countries is very large. 
The recommendations of this study are as 
follows: 
-  Research on the synergy of Indonesian 
instrument of maritime power against 
Chinese claims on Indonesian EEZ 
which intersects with NDL in the 
harmonized policy section can be 
developed into further new research to 
find out what the scheme harmonized 
Indonesian Government’s policy on 
China’s claim over the SCS is. Research 
on the analysis of China's instruments 
of maritime power on the LCS to find 
out how China regulates its maritime 
power instruments to maintain NDL 
claims can be an advanced research and 
complement the discussion in this 
study. 
-  The Government of Indonesia, 
especially its instruments of maritime 
power, needs to develop harmonized 
policies for issues that disrupt the 
defense and security of the Republic of 
Indonesia, where the Coordinating 
Ministry of Politics, Law and Security 
and Coordinating Ministry of Maritime 
Affairs will formulate and monitor 
policies of ministries in their fields. 
-  MoFA needs to prioritize Indonesia's 
national interests and increase the 
intensity of communication and 
approach with Indonesian instruments 
of maritime power in order to obtain a 
comprehensive picture of the problems 
on the field and to create an effective 
and targeted diplomacy. 
-  MOMAF needs to expand its ministerial 
strategy more than just safeguarding 
the sea and the resources in it. The 
MOMAF needs to focus on managing 
marine and fisheries resources, 
especially the development of a 
national fishing fleet so that Indonesian 
fishermen can manage their fish catch 
capacity up to the EEZ. 
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-  The Indonesian government, especially 
its instrument of maritime power, 
needs to rearrange ROE in the field to 
build compatibility between authority 
and capability. 
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